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**Africa Review**

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**31 May 1985**

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Rightwing Afrikaner groups, apparently trying to broaden their support, have become increasingly strident in criticizing US influence on Pretoria's policies.

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President Stevens is trying to arrange for Army Commander Momoh to succeed him peacefully in December, but rivalry and uncertainty over the succession issue could lead to a military coup.

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Prime Minister Jonathan's shift away from the West to a policy of nonalignment has led to the opening of Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean diplomatic missions in Maseru.

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**Zaire-Israel: Mobutu's Trip to Israel**

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Zairian President Mobutu's recent state visit to Israel did not produce any major new aid agreements, but reaffirmed solidarity between the two countries at a time when Libyan leader Qadhafi has increased public threats against Mobutu.

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*Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,*

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## Articles

### South Africa: Anti-Americanism on the Right

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The Afrikaner right has become strident in its criticism of US influence on Pretoria's domestic and foreign policies, as conservative Afrikaners increasingly view Washington as a threat to the *Afrikaner volk* (nation). Rightwing political parties, cultural organizations, and paramilitary groups have begun to make anti-Americanism a staple of their political propaganda.

Conservative Afrikaners—like most white South Africans—welcomed the election of President Reagan, but they have been angered over the past six months by the President's criticism of apartheid and his reception of Bishop Tutu. Recent statements by leaders of the right condemn the United States for interference in South Africa's domestic political process and hold the Reagan administration at least indirectly responsible—by pressing Pretoria to reform—for the current round of unrest in South Africa.

The right evidently is using anti-Americanism as a way of broadening its base of support in the Afrikaner community. This tactic is similar to that used successfully by the *Afrikaner Broederbond* (Brotherhood) and other cultural organizations redundant in the 1930s and 1940s to rally support for the National Party by whipping up anti-English sentiment against a government dominated by English speakers. Under the influence of virulent anti-British propaganda at that time, tens of thousands of Afrikaners joined proto-Nazi organizations like the *Ossewa Brandwag* (Ox Wagon Sentinels), the *Stormjaers* (Stormtroopers), and the New Order and favored Germany over Britain during World War II.

#### Rhetorical Excesses


Anti-Americanism has become a staple of the rightwing press and a frequent theme of political oratory at rallies. The major thrust is that Washington—rather than Pretoria—controls events in South Africa.

- The largest rightwing political party, the Conservative Party, frequently criticizes US South African policy in the South African Parliament. Last month, a leading Conservative Party parliamentarian blamed US pressure for instigating reforms by President Botha's regime which, he believed, caused the recent violence in the black townships.
- Using a similar theme the weekly journal of the *Herstigste Nasionale Party* (the Reconstituted National Party) recently accused the ruling National Party of being "the helpless hostage of the Yanks," and referred to the Botha regime as "an extension of the White House."
- At a rally held by the *Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging* (Armed Resistance) in Pretoria on 1 May, speakers equated "American liberalism" with "Kremlin Communism" and blamed the current unrest in the Eastern Cape on "the evil influence of American liberalism."
- In late May, the *Afrikaner Volkswag* (People's Guard), an informal alliance of the major South African cultural and political organizations, held a two-day conference in Pretoria on "Afrikaner Culture and the Onslaught of American Liberalism."

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Moderate Afrikaner version of radical right

### Rightwing Paramilitary Organizations

The Afrikaner Armed Resistance has been developed by its leader Eugene Terre'blanche, into an Afrikaner fascist movement. Its members use the uniforms and symbols of the Nazi Party, and Terre'blanche ends speeches with the Hitler salute. The movement has been implicated in numerous assaults on English and Afrikaner moderates as well as National Party organizers during the past four years. On several occasions, it has tarred and feathered "Afrikaner traitors" and trashed the offices of moderate academics and clergymen.

The government views the Afrikaner Armed Resistance as a security threat. Minister of Police Louis Le Grange stated in parliament last year that the Security Police monitored the group's activities; he described it and other rightwing paramilitary organizations as security problems in a conversation with a journalist. In 1984, the government prosecuted two Afrikaner Armed Resistance members for conspiring to bomb multiracial hotels and casinos; both received long prison terms. Deputy Minister of Law and Order Vlok stated in mid-May that no member of the groups would be permitted in the South African Security Forces.

The other major paramilitary group, the *Wit Kommando* (White Commando), has a membership estimated at approximately 500 and is more clandestine and violent. In a press statement issued last year, the group noted that its declared policy was "to warn first, and later to eliminate, if necessary, all

persons, institutions and organizations promoting racial integration and black rule in South Africa." It has claimed credit for several bombings in the past five years and was probably responsible for the murder of a white civil rights activist.

### Outlook

We expect rightwing propaganda directed against Botha's policy of reform and the United States to become even more strident. Although the paramilitary groups constitute only the extreme fringe of the South African right and we have no evidence that they pose an immediate terrorist threat to American personnel or facilities in South Africa, we believe that the continued frustration of the Afrikaner right could lead to anti-US violence.

The most likely threat would come from the paramilitary groups. An operation probably would be directed at gaining maximum publicity, such as by attacking an unattended USIA library/cultural center, which have been heavily utilized by black South Africans.

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## Sierra Leone: The Succession Crisis

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Siaka Stevens, Sierra Leone's Head of State since 1968, plans to retire this December, and is trying to arrange for his legal succession by Gen. Joseph Momoh—the current Army Commander. In the past, Stevens announced periodic “retirement” plans as a ploy to gauge his political adversaries' intentions. We and the US Embassy believe, however, that the 85-year-old President is serious this time. According to the US Embassy, Stevens selected Momoh—a fellow member of the Limba ethnic group and a member of the single political party—in the expectation Momoh will preserve the existing political system and forestall any malfeasance charges against Stevens and his cronies. Momoh must first be approved by the sole party, the All Peoples Congress (APC), at its congress scheduled for mid-July. The congress has been delayed at least twice, possibly because Stevens lacked the broadbased support needed to elevate Momoh. If Momoh lacks the support to get elected, he may stage a coup against the government, or frustrated junior officers may step in to end political uncertainty and to give the country fresh leadership.

### The Public Mood

According to the US Embassy, a strong anti-Stevens mood has developed in the past few months, and little public support remains for his staying in office. Even the once-complacent press suggests it is time for him to go. Such a reaction is not surprising, in our view, because Stevens is leaving a legacy of corruption, bureaucratic incompetence, and economic decline. Sierra Leone's near economic collapse is a key source of public discontent and urban unrest. Under Stevens, the potentially rich agricultural sector has languished. Once a net exporter of rice, Sierra Leone must now import one-third of its needs. Last year, the US Embassy reported that economic growth was a marginal 0.5 percent. Production of key cash crops—cocoa, coffee, and palm kernels—declined in 1984. The foreign debt continues to grow—estimated at \$460 million last year—and the government shies away from an IMF agreement out of fear that the requisite removal of rice subsidies would provoke mass



President Stevens

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demonstrations. A flourishing black market and extensive smuggling of diamonds further erodes public confidence and perpetuates the economic decay.

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We believe that the potential for violence will continue to grow, particularly should  Stevens decide to prolong his stay. Civil servants—who are paid irregularly—and trade unionists—disgruntled over declining wages—may take to the streets to vent their anger. The US Embassy notes that students have demonstrated several times this year, ostensibly over the declining quality of schools, but probably intended as indirect protests against Stevens.

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### Stevens's Strategy

If Stevens can accomplish his plans successfully, a relatively smooth and orderly transfer of power will occur at the end of the year. The US Embassy notes, however, that the APC congress must first ratify constitutional amendments necessary to enable Momoh to become president. Necessary changes include reducing the age requirement from 50 to 45—Momoh is 48—and reducing the time a military officer must be retired to become a presidential

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General Momoh [redacted]

candidate, which is currently 12 months. Moreover, the US Embassy reports that Momoh must weather a challenge by First Vice President S. I. Koroma, who now is the legal successor and who seeks the presidency. The party's candidate will be approved pro forma by the voters in a national election at a still undetermined date. [redacted]

We do not believe Stevens seeks to perpetuate his rule.

[redacted] Stevens has been shipping his personal effects to the Canary Islands. This suggests he not only intends to retire, but believes his reputation, economic interests, and possibly his life may be threatened should he remain in the country. Stevens probably fears he may be placed on trial for corruption and misrule once he is out of office, and may not even be sure his anointed successor—General Momoh—can protect him. [redacted]

**General Momoh's Role**

General Momoh, head of the 3,200-strong military, appears to be backed by some segments of the APC in addition to Stevens. The US Embassy believes—and we agree—that Momoh probably was selected by Stevens in the hope that his military stature would allow for a smooth transition and prevent an Army coup. [redacted]

While Momoh probably can ensure a smooth transfer of power—if he is selected by the APC as the presidential candidate—his options once in office will be limited. [redacted]

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[redacted] Party stalwarts and military supporters would press him to maintain the status quo and to repay political debts with patronage and other forms of favoritism. [redacted]

Momoh probably will retain the support of ranking officers—who will benefit from corruption schemes—including Brig. Sheku Tarawalli, the most likely candidate to replace him as Army Commander, according to the US Embassy. Tarawalli supports Momoh's bid for the presidency and opposes Koroma, the Embassy reports. Tarawalli, current Chief of Staff, is a professional soldier with a low political profile and is said to be well respected in the military, [redacted] We note, however, that in 1967 he was arrested for participation in a coup plot, and in the following year he was arrested for his role in an Army mutiny. [redacted]

**Potential Challengers: Junior Officers**  
US Embassy and [redacted]

[redacted] some junior officers seek a purge of government, possibly including the arrest and execution of the more corrupt members. These officers probably are disgusted with the institutionalized profiteering and regard Momoh as no better than Stevens. On the other hand, [redacted] some junior officers support Momoh in the expectation that the benefits of graft and corruption will filter down to their level. [redacted]

Momoh probably is aware of potential junior officer unrest. The US Embassy points out that he maintains an ethnic balance in key units, which prevents officers from displaying their intentions openly. Moreover, since weapons are securely stored, officers and enlisted personnel probably do not have immediate access to the arms necessary for a coup. [redacted]

**Civilian Contenders: Koroma and Other APC Stalwarts**

**Koroma's Ambitions.** Koroma, who has served as First Vice President since 1971 and is one of the founding members of the APC, desperately seeks the




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S. I. Koroma

presidency and has resisted Stevens's efforts to remove him. As one of the key members of the regime for most of Stevens's tenure, Koroma believes he has earned the right to be president. According to the US Embassy, he argues that Momoh lacks the support even within the military to rule.

Koroma was once regarded as Stevens's heir, but in the past few years their relationship has become strained and Stevens no longer believes Koroma would protect his image. He probably fears that if Koroma succeeds him, an anti-Stevens campaign would be launched and possibly a show-trial would result.



As a result of Stevens's inability to get Koroma to step aside, the President may be resorting to legal maneuvers to ensure that the First Vice President cannot become his permanent successor. The US Embassy reports that parliament—acting on Stevens's request—plans to establish an interim council, that would rule should Stevens fall ill or die before his term expires in December. Although Koroma would

still become acting president under this system, he would lose the power to control the presidential succession process, the US Embassy observes.

While Koroma probably lacks the necessary delegate support to be selected as Sierra Leone's next president, we believe he has a few assets which may hamper Stevens's maneuverings. As a competent party organizer, Koroma has developed a network of allies and supporters.

Koroma may appeal to members of his fellow Temnes ethnic group to resort to violence if he concludes he has no other options. We also observe that Koroma has armed thugs on his payroll, who may be deployed to demonstrate his potential strength.

**Other Key Participants.** According to the US Embassy, several other figures in the Stevens administration regard themselves as presidential candidates. While there is no clear evidence to suggest any of these officials will become Stevens's successor, at least some of them may play a key role in the party congress, in the ongoing political realignment, and in a post-Stevens Sierra Leone.

**Francis Minah.** As a Second Vice President since 1984, Minah expects to play a key role in a future Momoh administration. According to the US Embassy, Momoh has promised to elevate him to the First Vice Presidency. A charismatic Mende—the key southern ethnic group—Minah is regarded by the Embassy as intelligent, pragmatic, and energetic. In recent years, he has worked behind the scenes in the APC to smooth over personal differences between members.

Several factors, however, work against Minah's quest for a key post in a Momoh regime. that some military officers are thought to regard him as too controversial. Many Sierra Leoneans regard him as ruthless, with unlimited ambitions. Minah's image was tarnished by his handling of parliamentary elections in 1982, when violence was used to gain the election of a protege in his home district. Moreover, according to the US Embassy, some Mende have distrusted him since his

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jump in 1973 from the then existing opposition party, the Mende-dominant Sierra Leone People's Party, to the APC. According to the Embassy, Minah is corrupt and engaged in shady financial dealings with unscrupulous Lebanese businessmen. [ ]

**Jusu-Sheriff.** Salia Jusu-Sheriff, a Mende, and Minister of Development and Economic Planning since 1984, supports Koroma's bid for the presidency, according to the US Embassy. Jusu-Sheriff probably expects that, if Koroma becomes president, he would be elevated to the first vice presidency and eventually would rule the country. [ ]

The US Embassy reports that Jusu-Sheriff has numerous enemies. The influential Lebanese business community, senior military officers, and many APC members are thought to oppose his ambitions. Moreover, we see no indication Stevens regards Jusu-Sheriff as a potential replacement. [ ] relations between Stevens and Jusu-Sheriff are strained, reportedly over the latter's refusal to participate more actively in corrupt government practices. Jusu-Sheriff also is widely disliked by the public because of his backing for unpopular economic reforms. Nonetheless, the Embassy regards him as comparatively honest, ambitious, and able. [ ]

#### **Prospects**

Sierra Leone is entering an increasingly unstable period as the succession crisis looms. Should Stevens fail to orchestrate Momoh's presidency at the party congress, we predict a bitter power struggle that could spark ethnic violence or a coup. Fuel shortages, declining wages, and a cut in the rice subsidy could spark urban unrest at any time. [ ]

We cannot rule out a behind-the-scenes agreement between Stevens and Koroma. Should Stevens realize he needs Koroma's backing to get Momoh elected, the President may offer [ ] Koroma an honorific post. If that fails, Stevens may have no other choice but to give Koroma increased political powers in his current position in order to gain his backing for Momoh. Stevens clearly fears Koroma's potential to stir violence and bloc constitutional changes, or he would have dismissed the First Vice President, as he is constitutionally permitted to do. [ ]

We believe there will be a military coup if Stevens dies or fails to get Momoh elected—and Koroma becomes president. Koroma is despised by senior military officers, who probably fear their spoils of office would be threatened under his rule. Koroma, moreover, would probably lack the popular and APC support needed to overcome potential challenges from the military. [ ]

Should Momoh come to power, either through the constitutional process or as the head of a military government, we believe he would face mounting economic and political challenges. In either case, senior APC officials and senior military officers would pressure him to maintain the Stevens-era system of corruption and graft. On the other hand, we believe unemployed youth, the trade unions, and possibly junior officers would pressure him for reforms. If Momoh failed to introduce significant economic reforms—such as a crackdown on the Lebanese business community and more concrete efforts to prevent the smuggling of cash crops and diamonds to neighboring countries—Sierra Leone's financial situation would continue to deteriorate. Although Momoh is pro-Western, we believe the potential for instability under his rule probably would increase chances for Soviet and Libyan meddling. [ ]

Should junior officers come to power, we believe they would pursue a more nonaligned and possibly radical course. Junior officers might blame the West for helping Stevens remain in power and react positively to Soviet overtures of economic and military aid. Young officers—in their quest for popular support—probably would put on trial and even execute corrupt Stevens's administration officials. Junior officers, moreover, probably would mount an anticorruption drive to improve the economic climate. We also believe, however, that a junior officer regime at least initially would be unstable because it would be likely to contain both radical and more moderate factions. Instability in turn would encourage Soviet and Libyan meddling. [ ]

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**Lesotho: Looking Left** ☐

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Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan initiated a major shift to a policy of "nonalignment" in 1983 by inviting five Communist countries with which Lesotho had already established diplomatic relations to open missions in Maseru. The Soviet Union, China, and North Korea accepted the invitation, while Yugoslavia and Romania declined for economic reasons. We believe South Africa, which strongly opposes the presence of Communist embassies in Lesotho, will be unable to press Jonathan to reverse the decision. ☐

**Background**

Lesotho, physically surrounded by and dependent economically<sup>1</sup> on South Africa, generally has followed a policy oriented toward the West since achieving independence from the United Kingdom in 1966. While Lesotho nominally is a constitutional monarchy, all political power and decisionmaking authority presently is held by Jonathan and his ruling Basotho National Party. A significant tenet of the party's platform until 1983 was its strong anti-Communism. In our judgment, however, Jonathan is willing to seek assistance wherever he can find it. He has emphasized his new nonaligned policy in the press. ☐

Although Jonathan publicly justified the establishment of relations with Bloc countries as a means of attracting more friends in the international community, in our opinion, he was attempting to reduce his dependence on South Africa and legitimize his position as a Frontline State leader. Pretoria has tried to use economic leverage in the past to stop Lesotho's support for the African National Congress (ANC). At the time that Jonathan made his overture to the five Communist states, relations with South

<sup>1</sup> Remittances from migrants working in South Africa account for over 40 percent of Lesotho's GDP. Lesotho is a member of the Southern African Customs Union. Customs Union duties collected by South Africa for Lesotho—including a substantial grant above funds actually collected—account for 70 percent of government revenue. Ninety-five percent of Lesotho's imports originate in South Africa. ☐



Prime Minister Jonathan ☐

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Africa had deteriorated significantly, highlighted by a December 1982 South African Defense Force raid into Maseru against ANC targets. ☐

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In spite of the Communist presence, there has been a significant warming trend in relations between Lesotho and South Africa in the last 18 months. The number of Jonathan's diatribes against apartheid have decreased markedly since late 1983. The Highlands Water Project, under which South Africa will buy much-needed water from Lesotho, is moving forward once again. There have been only a few attacks in the last year by South African-backed Lesotho insurgents and it is not clear whether they were conducted at the behest of Pretoria. In addition, according to press reports in Lesotho, South Africa has dropped its demand that Lesotho sign a security agreement similar to the 1984 Nkomati accord between South Africa and Mozambique. ☐

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**Communists Arrive**

The presence of Communist embassies has become a controversial issue in the campaigning for upcoming elections, which may be held later this year. Jonathan's opening to the East has damaged the strong support he formerly enjoyed from the large

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number of conservative Catholics in the country, according to Embassy reporting. Opposition to the Communist presence has been a major factor in the formation of new political alignments and fledgling parties dedicated to closing the embassies and replacing Jonathan. [ ]

**Soviet Union.** The Soviet Embassy has remained small, with five to six Soviet staff members, since it opened in 1983 and Moscow only recently named its first resident ambassador, who is due to arrive this summer. Despite this slow start, both sides have gained benefits from this new relationship. The US Embassy reports that Moscow has offered 50 scholarships to Lesotho students to study in the USSR. [ ]

The Soviets have stationed a TASS representative in Maseru. In addition, regular Aeroflot flights from Maputo to the new Maseru International Airport are scheduled to begin this summer. The new service could allow Lesotho to circumvent South African control over imports such as military equipment and supplies. Presently, all flights to Maseru stop in South Africa first. In early 1983, when relations were at a low point, South Africa refused to allow delivery of military equipment to Lesotho. The embargo was not lifted until October 1984. [ ]

The Soviets have made an effort to play a role in the local political scene. [ ] Soviet diplomats have established contacts with senior government personnel outside of official channels. [ ] the Soviets have been approaching young Basotho<sup>2</sup> who have studied in the Soviet Union and asking them about their willingness to help promote "joint Soviet-Lesotho objectives."

<sup>2</sup> The Basotho are the primary tribal grouping in Lesotho. [ ]

### **Leftists in Lesotho**

In 1984 Jonathan began to allow the previously banned Lesotho Communist Party (LCP) to function openly. [ ] he views the small but increasingly active LCP as a political counterweight to the new National Independence Party that is backed by the powerful Catholic Church in Lesotho. The LCP reportedly supports a newspaper at the University of Lesotho that is published by South African students with ties to the ANC. The LCP recently has been able to expand its influence with Jonathan, who in turn has used party members as intermediaries to promote better relations between Lesotho and Mozambique. [ ]

Several prominent members of the government are reported to be pro-Soviet leftists:

- Foreign Minister Vincent Makhele is characterized [ ] as a leftist, but probably not a Communist, according to US Embassy reporting. The Embassy also reports that Makhele is president of the Lesotho Peace and Solidarity Committee, a ruling party front group associated with the World Peace Council. 25X1
- Information Minister Desmond Sixishe is widely considered to be a dedicated Communist, according to US Embassy sources. 25X1
- Finance Minister K. T. J. Rakhetla is characterized [ ] as one of the most hardcore Communists in Lesotho. US Embassy reporting indicates he studied in Yugoslavia in 1965. 25X1
- Personal Secretary to the Prime Minister R. P. Matete is Secretary General of the Lesotho Peace and Solidarity Committee, a group that serves as a conduit for contacts between Maseru and Bloc countries. [ ] 25X1

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The Soviets reportedly used two Lesotho youths to distribute secretly over 200 copies of a book extolling Lenin and the virtues of Communism on the main University of Lesotho campus. [redacted]

[redacted] We believe that Soviet efforts in the local scene are likely to remain modest. Lesotho security officials closely monitor Soviet activities and so far the government has failed to approve a request to increase the number of Soviets allowed in Maseru. [redacted]

**China.** China has moved cautiously since opening its Embassy in 1983. The Chinese Ambassador in Maseru told the US Embassy that China's main concern in Lesotho is monitoring Soviet activities in southern Africa. In addition, both countries view the relationship as a means to enhance their positions in the Nonaligned Movement and the United Nations. The large Chinese mission is devoted primarily to agricultural development assistance, according to US Embassy officials. China also provided a \$9 million loan to Lesotho. Chinese officials informed the US Embassy that the loan was to compensate Maseru for severing relations with Taiwan, which previously had an active assistance program in the country. [redacted]

**North Korea.** The North Korean Embassy is the most active of the new missions in Lesotho, according to the US Embassy. The North Koreans assigned a resident ambassador in mid-1983 who is believed by Embassy officials to have easy access to Prime Minister Jonathan. P'yongyang reportedly is funding the construction of an office building in Maseru that will house both the Prime Minister's office and a new North Korean embassy. US Embassy officials also have heard unconfirmed rumors that Jonathan has received a large amount of money from the North Koreans for his personal use. [redacted]

North Korea and Lesotho signed a military training agreement in July 1983. [redacted]

[redacted] Under the terms of the agreement, Lesotho was to send trainees to North Korea for instruction and North Korea was to provide military advisers to Lesotho. To date, however, the North Koreans

apparently have only provided drill instruction to members of the ruling party's Youth League. Lesotho Paramilitary Force Commander Maj. Gen. Lekhanya has told US Embassy officers that his forces are not being trained by North Korea and he is well satisfied with the training provided by British military advisers. Moreover, according to the US Embassy, the British have threatened to end their training mission if any North Korean military advisers arrive in Lesotho. [redacted]

North Korea's efforts in Lesotho are part of a longstanding campaign to expand its recognition and influence abroad at the expense of South Korea. P'yongyang pressured Maseru to suspend relations with Seoul at the time North Korea opened its mission in 1983. South Korea is attempting to restore relations, and [redacted]

[redacted] Jonathan may now support such a move. [redacted]

#### Outlook

During the last year Jonathan has succeeded in improving relations with South Africa and expanding ties with his newfound Communist "friends," while maintaining Western donor support. We believe, however, that South Africa is deeply concerned with the presence of Communist embassies in Lesotho. This concern may lead to future actions by Pretoria that strain the fragile detente between the two countries. [redacted]

The military and security forces, in our view, will serve as a check against any significant expansion of Lesotho's existing ties with Communist states. The commander of the Lesotho Paramilitary Force is opposed to any Communist military training, according to US Embassy sources. Moreover, top Lesotho police and military officials at a National Security meeting in June 1984 agreed that the potential Soviet threat is serious and recommended that every effort be made to keep the Soviet mission at its then current strength. [redacted]

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Jonathan and the ruling party are likely to play down their new ties with the Communist states to avoid alienating Lesotho's large Catholic population further before elections. We believe the opposition parties will continue attempts to exploit the issue, but they are unlikely to win elections on this issue alone.

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We agree with the US Embassy's opinion that Jonathan will emphasize his "dynamic approach" to foreign policy, which has resulted in enhanced ties with Lesotho's black neighbors, peaceful coexistence with South Africa, and high-level attention and massive infusions of aid from donor countries.

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### Zaire-Israel: Mobutu's Trip to Israel

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Zairian President Mobutu's recent six-day state visit to Israel solidified bilateral relations that were renewed in 1982 when Kinshasa became the first black African country to reestablish formal ties with Tel Aviv since the Yom Kippur war in 1967. Mobutu's visit followed that of Liberian Head of State Doe who traveled to Israel after reestablishing ties in 1984.

terms—would have a significant negative impact on its IMF stabilization program.

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based Special Presidential Brigade and Shaba-based Kamanyola Division will continue, but Israeli loans or grants for new equipment are unlikely.

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In our view, although the visit did not result in any major new aid agreements, it reaffirmed solidarity between the two countries at a time when Libyan leader Qadhafi has increased his public threats against Mobutu for dealing with Israel.<sup>1</sup> New accords were signed to increase bilateral trade, aid, and investment, but economic constraints are likely to limit their implementation. According to the US Embassy and press reports, Tel Aviv agreed to:

Tel Aviv's financial difficulties also limit its ability to increase economic aid, which presently consists only of a small number of technical advisers. Israeli President Herzog has been encouraging private Jewish businessmen in Europe and the United States to invest in Zaire as a substitute for official aid, but his attempts have met with little success. According to press reports, Mobutu criticized Israel for not following through on an earlier commitment to encourage Jewish investors—probably a reference to a highly publicized \$400 million investment program headed by industrialist Leon Tamman that has not materialized. Tel Aviv's decision to sign the reciprocity agreement and its promise to make greater efforts to encourage private investment in Zaire probably was an attempt to appease Mobutu, who was angered by the failure of negotiations with the Tamman Group.

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- Provide easy credit terms for Zaire to purchase military hardware.
- Set up a joint commission to deal with bilateral cooperation.
- Open air links and increase aid to Zaire's agricultural and health sectors.
- Sign an accord that calls for reciprocity of investment. The key element in the accord states that government assistance to Israeli businesses interested in investing in Zaire will equal Zairian provisions for assistance to Zairian businesses interested in Israel.

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We believe budget constraints will effectively limit the ability of both countries to follow through on the new agreements. According to the US Embassy, Zaire has no money to buy arms, and any indebtedness incurred to do so—even on easy credit

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<sup>1</sup> See the following brief on Qadhafi's visit to Burundi during which he made threats against Mobutu.

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## Africa Briefs

### Burundi-Libya

#### Qadhafi Visits Bujumbura

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Libyan leader Qadhafi's two-day state visit to Burundi has set the stage for closer bilateral ties and an increased Libyan presence that we believe will be used to destabilize neighboring Zaire.  Qadhafi presented Burundi with \$50 million to pay some of its external debts and gave President Bagaza a personal check for an undisclosed amount of money. Mrs. Qadhafi donated \$75,000 to local charities. In addition, Libya released \$2.4 million from the Burundi-Libyan Arab holding company for joint projects and agreed to renew arms shipments to Burundi.

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We believe Qadhafi's immediate objective during this trip—which closely followed Zairian President Mobutu's visit to Israel—was to shore up flagging black African support for Arab efforts to isolate Israel. In addition, Qadhafi—who recently quashed a coup plot against his regime—may have intended to demonstrate his control at home by traveling abroad.

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Beyond this immediate tactical objective, Qadhafi probably hoped to use economic inducements to gain Bagaza's acquiescence to an increased Libyan presence and the use of Burundi as a base for operations against Zaire. In our judgment, Qadhafi may increase resources directed at removing Mobutu now that Sudanese President Nimir has been overthrown. According to the US Embassy, Qadhafi's toast at the state dinner was highlighted by a lengthy denunciation of Mobutu that included eight specific threats to kill or depose the Zairian leader. In our view, Bagaza's recent inability to deal with economic and political problems makes him susceptible to the lure of Qadhafi's easy money and may cause him to allow Tripoli to use Burundi's territory for subversion against Zaire.

25X1

### Mozambique

#### Agricultural Reforms

25X1

Maputo has increased incentives and support for private farmers to revitalize Mozambican agriculture, according to US Embassy reporting. The new measures—the latest in an economic liberalization program that the government launched in 1983—include removal of price controls on some staple crops and higher prices for others. So far, the government has increased the producer prices for corn and wheat by 100 percent. In addition, the reforms call for channeling financial support—provided primarily from Western sources—to help private farmers acquire seed, equipment, training, and advisory services.

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Maputo's previous policies had stressed state farms, communal villages, and cooperatives, but they neglected private farmers, who produce about three-quarters of Mozambique's agricultural output. Such policies contributed to

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increased support by the peasants for the insurgency that is now disrupting the country's transport, agricultural production, and marketing links. The course of the insurgency will have a major impact on the success of the government's new agricultural policies and its overall efforts to revitalize the economy.

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**Zimbabwe****Foreign Exchange Decisions** 

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Zimbabwe has announced plans to increase foreign exchange allocations to industries this year and reinstate dividend and profit remittances in 1986, according to US Embassy reporting. Ministry officials expect the 30-percent increase in foreign currency allocations to boost imports of materials needed badly by domestic industry to aid economic recovery. Dividend and profit remittances were suspended last year because of Zimbabwe's deteriorating balance-of-payments position. The remittances will be released in annual installments over a six-year period. Meanwhile, Harare is planning to meet with IMF officials this week to discuss conditions for a new agreement to replace the one suspended in March of 1984. Both foreign currency decisions should give partial satisfaction to the IMF and facilitate negotiations.

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